China’s stated 2026 plan against its 2025 actual and its 2026 progress.
China planned 140 launches for 2026 and is not on pace
Takeaway: 140 planned, 53 flown by 30 July: 87 needed in five months.
China’s target gap
China’s stated 2026 target against its 2025 actual and its 2026 progress to 30 July. The 140 figure is a stated plan, not a forecast or an achieved figure.
Takeaway: 140 planned, 53 flown by 30 July: 87 needed in five months.
China’s target gap
140 planned, 53 flown by 30 July: 87 needed in five months.
Rendering the interactive chart…
Expand data table
| Dimension | Series | Value | Value basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 stated target | Launches | 140 | Estimate | KeepTrack: China launch cadence and constellations 2025/2026 |
| 2025 actual (CNSA) | Launches | 92 | Actual | China National Space Administration via CCTV News, 3 January 2026 |
| 2026 to 30 July | Launches | 53 | Actual | Space Stats Online: orbital launches by year and country |
Caveat: The 140 is a stated plan, not a forecast. The implied ~91 full-year run rate is not plotted, because it is an extrapolation and Chinese cadence is back-loaded.
Data table
Download CSV| Item | Series | Launches | Source | Value basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 stated target | china_target_gap | 140 | KeepTrack: China launch cadence and constellations 2025/2026 | Estimate |
| 2025 actual (CNSA) | china_target_gap | 92 | China National Space Administration via CCTV News, 3 January 2026 | Actual |
| 2026 to 30 July | china_target_gap | 53 | Space Stats Online: orbital launches by year and country | Actual |
How this evidence was built
What it measures
This index answers one question: who actually launches to orbit, and why can nobody agree on the count? It deliberately does not cover SpaceX valuation, Starlink subscribers or launch cost per kilogram, those are the existing /data/space-economy index. This one is the launch market around SpaceX: national cadence, vehicle and range concentration, China’s gap to its own plan, and the measurement problem.
How it is calculated
- The annual series, the country tables, the vehicle table and the site table all count orbital launch attempts and all come from one compiler, so the methodology is constant across the seven years shown.
- Exact agreement on the success count is what makes this series usable despite neither source being a national agency.
Key context
- Basis: attempts, not successes.
- Mixing compilers across years would create a trend out of a definitional change.
- The 2026 figures are year-to-date at 30 July 2026 and are labelled as partial in every subtitle.
- Corroboration. The 2025 point is the one that can be checked against an independent compilation: 324 attempts and 315 successes here, against a separately assembled 315 successful launches elsewhere.
- Not extrapolated. The implied full-year 2026 run rates: about 310 worldwide and about 91 for China: appear in the section detail text as observations and are not seeded as data points.
- Launch activity is back-loaded within a calendar year, so a seven-month extrapolation is a weak estimator, and estimates do not belong on a chart of observed values.
- Dropped in verification. Three candidate series did not survive the verification pass and are absent rather than approximated: the Wikipedia 2026-in-spaceflight statistics tables (internally inconsistent totals); Guowang and Qianfan constellation sizes (the only available source returned an identical planned-satellite figure for both constellations, which is not credible as two independent values); and payload mass to orbit by country (no consistently-methodised open source found).
- Compiled and verified 2026-08-14.
Key numbers
- Orbital launch attempts: 114 (2020) → 324 (2025), ~23% cagr with no down year. 180 through 30 July 2026 (sso-launches).
- China led the world exactly once, in 2021 (55 to 51). By 2025 the gap was 193 to 93 (sso-launches).
- The US and China account for 162 of 180 attempts in 2026 to date, exactly 90% (sso-launches).
- Falcon 9 flew 88 of those 180 launches: 49% of world orbital access from one vehicle. The next four vehicles combined flew 29 (sso-launches).
Caveats
Caveat: The count is contested. Four credible compilations report Chinese 2025 orbital launches as 90, 92, 93 and 97, including 92 from China’s own space administration. That seven-launch spread is 7.8% of the total. The causes are definitional: attempts versus successes, whether a launch failing to reach orbit counts, attribution by launching state versus operator nationality, and local-versus-utc dating around the year boundary. None of the four publishes a reconciliation. This index charts all four rather than picking one, and readers should carry an uncertainty band of roughly plus or minus 4% on any Chinese launch share figure. The same disagreement exists for 2024 (66 versus 68).
Caveat: Top five only. The source publishes a top five for launch vehicles and for launch sites. Entries below the fifth are omitted rather than aggregated into a synthetic "other" bar, so those two charts do not sum to the world total and their subtitles say so.
Caveat: 140 is A plan. China’s 2026 target of 140 or more orbital missions is a stated plan, not a forecast and not an achievement. It is labelled as such in the subtitle and in the point’s basis label.
Do not use this to
- Payload mass to orbit by country or provider: no consistently-methodised open source was found, so capability is proxied only by launch count.
- Guowang and Qianfan constellation sizes, the only available source returned an identical planned-satellite figure for both, which is not credible as two independent values, so both were dropped.
- Launch counts for vehicles or sites below the published top five, omitted rather than aggregated into a synthetic "other".
- A definitive Chinese 2025 launch total. Four credible sources disagree and none publishes a reconciliation; this file shows all four.
Scope
July 2026
Sources
Last verified 10 Sept 2026