---
title: "The Orbital Launch Market — and the Numbers Nobody Agrees On"
slug: orbital-launch-market
type: data-index
sector: aerospace
canonical_url: https://deepstoryresearch.com/data/orbital-launch-market
series: [launches_by_year, us_vs_china, by_country_2026, china_count_conflict, china_target_gap, top_vehicles_2026, top_sites_2026]
series_count: 7
data_point_count: 37
data_as_of: 2026-07
source_quality: curated_snapshot
tier: free
generated_at: 2026-08-14
---

# The Orbital Launch Market — and the Numbers Nobody Agrees On
_Who launches to orbit — and why nobody agrees on the count_

> Deepstory Research context file · **Free tier** · <https://deepstoryresearch.com/data/orbital-launch-market>
> Self-contained AI briefing. Drop into an LLM window or RAG pipeline.

## AI research use contract

- Treat this file as source-grounded context, not a live database. Quote `source_ref` and `data_as_of` when using numbers.
- Separate `FACT`, `ESTIMATE`, `FORECAST`, `TARGET`, and `INFERENCE`. If a row basis is unclear, say it is unclear.
- Prefer T1/T2 sources for hard facts; use T3/T4 sources as context that should be checked before money, legal, medical, operational, or policy decisions.
- Keep answer structure clean: first say what the data says, then what you infer, then what would change the conclusion.

## Research upgrade checklist

- Always state whether a launch figure counts ATTEMPTS or SUCCESSES — that single choice moves the Chinese 2025 number by three.
- Never mix compilers across years; a methodology change reads as a trend.
- Carry a ±4% uncertainty band on any Chinese launch-share figure, and say which compiler produced the point estimate.
- Do not extrapolate a partial year — launch activity is back-loaded within a calendar year.
- Add payload mass to orbit if a consistently-methodised open source appears; it is the better measure of capability than launch count.

## TL;DR — index summary

Worldwide orbital launch attempts went from 114 in 2020 to 324 in 2025 — about 23% compound growth with no down year — and the United States and China now account for 90% of them. One vehicle, Falcon 9, flew 88 of the world’s 180 launches in the first seven months of 2026: 49% of global orbital access from a single product. Meanwhile China entered 2026 targeting 140 or more missions and had flown 53 by 30 July. And four credible compilations report China’s 2025 total as 90, 92, 93 and 97 — a 7.8% spread on a physically observable event.

## What this index covers

Seven series: total orbital launch attempts 2020–2026, US against China by year, 2026 attempts by launching state, the four-way disagreement over China’s 2025 count, China’s 2026 target against its pace, the top five launch vehicles of 2026, and the top five launch sites. Excludes SpaceX valuation, Starlink subscribers and launch cost per kilogram — see /data/space-economy.

**Series in this index:**

- `launches_by_year` — Total worldwide orbital launch attempts per calendar year.
- `us_vs_china` — Launch attempts by the two leading launch states, per year.
- `by_country_2026` — Who launched to orbit in 2026 and how often.
- `china_count_conflict` — How many times China launched in 2025, according to four different compilers.
- `china_target_gap` — China’s stated 2026 plan against its 2025 actual and its 2026 progress.
- `top_vehicles_2026` — Which vehicles flew the most in 2026 to date.
- `top_sites_2026` — Which ranges handled the most launches in 2026 to date.

**Entities tracked:** SpaceX (Falcon 9), Rocket Lab (Electron), Roscosmos (Soyuz-2), CASC (Long March), CNSA, ESA/Arianespace, ISRO, JAXA.

## Key findings

- Orbital launch attempts: 114 (2020) → 324 (2025), ~23% CAGR with no down year. 180 through 30 July 2026 (sso-launches).
- China led the world exactly once, in 2021 (55 to 51). By 2025 the gap was 193 to 93 (sso-launches).
- The US and China account for 162 of 180 attempts in 2026 to date — exactly 90% (sso-launches).
- Falcon 9 flew 88 of those 180 launches — 49% of world orbital access from one vehicle. The next four vehicles combined flew 29 (sso-launches).
- China’s 2025 launch count is reported as 90, 92, 93 and 97 by four credible sources, including 92 from its own space administration — a 7.8% spread (ids-2025 / cnsa-cctv-2025 / sso-launches / keeptrack-china).
- China targeted 140+ launches for 2026 and had flown 53 by 30 July; reaching 140 would need 87 in five months, more than it has flown in any full year outside 2025 (keeptrack-china / sso-launches).
- Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral recorded 49 launches each in 2026 to date — 54% of all world launch activity from two ranges (sso-launches).
- Russia has fallen from 13% of world launch in 2020 to under 6% in 2026, not by launching much less but because everyone else launched much more (sso-launches).

## Evidence basis map

The free tables above show `source_ref` but not the row-level `value_basis`. This section mirrors the visible rows only, so AI tools can separate observed values from estimates, forecasts, targets, and derived values.

| series | row | source_ref | value_basis |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| launches_by_year | year=2020; launches=114 | sso-launches | 2020 year page: 114 attempts, 104 successes, 10 failures |
| launches_by_year | year=2021; launches=145 | sso-launches | 2021 year page: 145 attempts, 134 successes, 11 failures |
| launches_by_year | year=2022; launches=186 | sso-launches | 2022 year page: 186 attempts, 178 successes, 1 partial, 7 failures |
| launches_by_year | year=2023; launches=222 | sso-launches | 2023 year page: 222 attempts, 212 successes, 1 partial, 9 failures |
| launches_by_year | year=2024; launches=259 | sso-launches | 2024 year page: 259 attempts, 251 successes, 2 partial, 6 failures |
| us_vs_china | year=2020; usa=44; china=39 | sso-launches | 2020 country table |
| us_vs_china | year=2021; usa=51; china=55 | sso-launches | 2021 country table — the only year in the series China led |
| us_vs_china | year=2022; usa=87; china=64 | sso-launches | 2022 country table |
| us_vs_china | year=2023; usa=114; china=67 | sso-launches | 2023 country table |
| us_vs_china | year=2024; usa=154; china=68 | sso-launches | 2024 country table |
| by_country_2026 | country=United States; launches=109 | sso-launches | 2026 country table as of 30 July 2026 |
| by_country_2026 | country=China; launches=53 | sso-launches | 2026 country table as of 30 July 2026 |
| by_country_2026 | country=Russia; launches=10 | sso-launches | 2026 country table as of 30 July 2026 |
| by_country_2026 | country=Europe; launches=4 | sso-launches | 2026 country table as of 30 July 2026 |
| by_country_2026 | country=India; launches=2 | sso-launches | 2026 country table as of 30 July 2026 |
| china_count_conflict | source_name=Ill-Defined Space (successes); launches=90 | ids-2025 | 2025 global summary: China 90 launches, +24% on 2024’s 66. Counts successful launches only |
| china_count_conflict | source_name=CNSA via CCTV News; launches=92 | cnsa-cctv-2025 | China National Space Administration figure reported 3 January 2026: "92 space launches in 2025", more than 300 satellites |
| china_count_conflict | source_name=Space Stats Online (attempts); launches=93 | sso-launches | 2025 country table. Counts attempts including failures |
| china_count_conflict | source_name=KeepTrack; launches=97 | keeptrack-china | China launch cadence deep dive: "2025 actual: 97 orbital missions" |
| china_target_gap | item=2026 stated target; launches=140 | keeptrack-china | STATED PLAN, not a forecast or an actual: "2026 target: 140 or more orbital missions" |
| china_target_gap | item=2025 actual (CNSA); launches=92 | cnsa-cctv-2025 | China National Space Administration figure via CCTV, 3 January 2026 |
| china_target_gap | item=2026 to 30 July; launches=53 | sso-launches | PARTIAL YEAR: 2026 country table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_vehicles_2026 | vehicle=Falcon 9; launches=88 | sso-launches | 2026 top-vehicles table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_vehicles_2026 | vehicle=Electron; launches=10 | sso-launches | 2026 top-vehicles table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_vehicles_2026 | vehicle=Soyuz-2; launches=8 | sso-launches | 2026 top-vehicles table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_vehicles_2026 | vehicle=CZ-6A; launches=7 | sso-launches | 2026 top-vehicles table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_vehicles_2026 | vehicle=CZ-2D; launches=4 | sso-launches | 2026 top-vehicles table as of 30 July 2026. The source publishes a top five only; vehicles below this are omitted rather than aggregated |
| top_sites_2026 | site=Vandenberg SFB; launches=49 | sso-launches | 2026 launch-site table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_sites_2026 | site=Cape Canaveral; launches=49 | sso-launches | 2026 launch-site table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_sites_2026 | site=Jiuquan; launches=19 | sso-launches | 2026 launch-site table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_sites_2026 | site=Wenchang; launches=14 | sso-launches | 2026 launch-site table as of 30 July 2026 |
| top_sites_2026 | site=Taiyuan; launches=9 | sso-launches | 2026 launch-site table as of 30 July 2026. The source publishes a top five only; sites below this are omitted rather than aggregated |

## The series (per-chart briefings)

### Launches by year — line
**Direct answer:** Total worldwide orbital launch attempts per calendar year.
**Time bracket:** 2020–2026 YTD

| year | launches | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2020 | 114 | sso-launches |
| 2021 | 145 | sso-launches |
| 2022 | 186 | sso-launches |
| 2023 | 222 | sso-launches |
| 2024 | 259 | sso-launches |

_+2 more rows on the live page and in the full working dataset._

**Read:** Nearly tripled in five years, ~23% compound, with no down year.
**Caveat:** Counts ATTEMPTS, not successes, from one compiler throughout. The 2026 point is partial — 30 July.

### US vs China — grouped-bar
**Direct answer:** Launch attempts by the two leading launch states, per year.
**Time bracket:** 2020–2026 YTD

| year | usa | china | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2020 | 44 | 39 | sso-launches |
| 2021 | 51 | 55 | sso-launches |
| 2022 | 87 | 64 | sso-launches |
| 2023 | 114 | 67 | sso-launches |
| 2024 | 154 | 68 | sso-launches |

_+2 more rows on the live page and in the full working dataset._

**Read:** US up 4.4x since 2020, China 2.4x. The divergence is one vehicle, not a national programme.
**Caveat:** The 2026 pair is partial-year. Chinese totals carry the ±4% definitional band described below.

### 2026 by country — hbar
**Direct answer:** Who launched to orbit in 2026 and how often.
**Time bracket:** 1 Jan – 30 Jul 2026

| country | launches | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- |
| United States | 109 | sso-launches |
| China | 53 | sso-launches |
| Russia | 10 | sso-launches |
| Europe | 4 | sso-launches |
| India | 2 | sso-launches |

_+1 more row on the live page and in the full working dataset._

**Read:** Two countries, 90%. Everyone else divides eighteen launches.
**Caveat:** Sums to 180, reconciling with the annual series. Partial year.

### The China counting problem — hbar
**Direct answer:** How many times China launched in 2025, according to four different compilers.
**Time bracket:** calendar 2025

| source_name | launches | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ill-Defined Space (successes) | 90 | ids-2025 |
| CNSA via CCTV News | 92 | cnsa-cctv-2025 |
| Space Stats Online (attempts) | 93 | sso-launches |
| KeepTrack | 97 | keeptrack-china |

**Read:** 90 to 97 — a seven-launch spread on a physically observable event, including 92 from China’s own agency.
**Caveat:** The causes are definitional: attempts vs successes, whether a failure to reach orbit counts, attribution by launching state vs operator, and local-vs-UTC dating at the year boundary. None of the four publishes a reconciliation.

### China’s target gap — bar
**Direct answer:** China’s stated 2026 plan against its 2025 actual and its 2026 progress.
**Time bracket:** 2025 actual, 2026 target and YTD

| item | launches | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2026 stated target | 140 | keeptrack-china |
| 2025 actual (CNSA) | 92 | cnsa-cctv-2025 |
| 2026 to 30 July | 53 | sso-launches |

**Read:** 140 planned, 53 flown by 30 July — 87 needed in five months.
**Caveat:** The 140 is a STATED PLAN, not a forecast. The implied ~91 full-year run rate is NOT plotted, because it is an extrapolation and Chinese cadence is back-loaded.

### Top launch vehicles — hbar
**Direct answer:** Which vehicles flew the most in 2026 to date.
**Time bracket:** 1 Jan – 30 Jul 2026

| vehicle | launches | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Falcon 9 | 88 | sso-launches |
| Electron | 10 | sso-launches |
| Soyuz-2 | 8 | sso-launches |
| CZ-6A | 7 | sso-launches |
| CZ-2D | 4 | sso-launches |

**Read:** Falcon 9 at 49% of world launch is the largest single concentration risk in the market.
**Caveat:** The source publishes a TOP FIVE only. Vehicles below the fifth are omitted rather than aggregated, so this does not sum to 180.

### Top launch sites — hbar
**Direct answer:** Which ranges handled the most launches in 2026 to date.
**Time bracket:** 1 Jan – 30 Jul 2026

| site | launches | source_ref |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Vandenberg SFB | 49 | sso-launches |
| Cape Canaveral | 49 | sso-launches |
| Jiuquan | 19 | sso-launches |
| Wenchang | 14 | sso-launches |
| Taiyuan | 9 | sso-launches |

**Read:** Vandenberg has drawn level with the Cape — a polar-orbit range now matching the historic heart of US launch.
**Caveat:** Top five only, same omission rule as the vehicle chart.

## Cross-series synthesis — why this matters

Read us_vs_china against top_vehicles_2026 and the apparent national race dissolves. The American number is not a national programme out-executing a rival state; it is one company operating one vehicle 88 times in seven months. China’s cadence, by contrast, is spread across many Long March variants each flying a handful of times. Those are different industrial structures, and the second one scales much more slowly — which is the mechanism behind the widening gap, not budget or ambition.

Read china_target_gap against us_vs_china for the constraint that actually matters. China’s two planned mega-constellations are dimensioned against a launch rate closer to 140 a year than to the ~91 its current pace implies. A launch rate that grew 2.4x in five years does not deploy roughly ten thousand satellites on the announced schedule, so the deployment timelines and the launch data are not consistent with each other.

Read china_count_conflict as a warning about every other chart on the internet. Four credible compilations disagree by 7.8% on a loud, tracked, catalogued event. Most published launch-market-share charts quietly select one compiler and present the result as fact. The practical discipline is to carry a ±4% band on Chinese share and to state which compiler produced any point estimate — this index shows all four rather than choosing.

Read top_sites_2026 for the constraint people underestimate. Two ranges handle 54% of world launch, and Vandenberg — a single-digit-per-year polar range at the start of the decade — now matches Cape Canaveral. Range turnaround, airspace and maritime closures, and pad availability are increasingly the binding limit rather than vehicle supply.

## Entities & relationships

| Entity | What they do | Key stat | Relationship |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| SpaceX | Launch operator | Falcon 9: 88 of 180 world launches in 2026 to 30 July | 49% of global orbital access; the market’s largest single point of failure |
| Rocket Lab | Small-launch operator | Electron: 10 launches in 2026 to date | Second-busiest vehicle in the world, and alone out-launched all of Europe |
| CASC / CNSA | Chinese state launch | 53 launches to 30 July 2026 against a 140+ target | Cadence spread across many vehicles; the constraint on two mega-constellations |
| Roscosmos | Russian state launch | Soyuz-2: 8 of Russia’s 10 launches in 2026 to date | Share of world launch fell from 13% (2020) to under 6% without launching much less |
| Europe (ESA / Arianespace) | European launch | 4 launches in 2026 to 30 July | Fewer launches in seven months than Rocket Lab’s Electron alone |

## Timeline of key events & decisions

- **2021** — China launches 55 times to America’s 51 → the only year in this series China led
- **2024** — World passes 250 attempts; US reaches 154 → the gap becomes structural rather than cyclical
- **2025** — Record 324 attempts, 315 successes; US 193, China 93 → the highest year on record and the year the count is disputed
- **3 Jan 2026** — CNSA reports 92 Chinese launches for 2025 via CCTV → a national agency figure that still does not settle the count
- **Early 2026** — China targets 140+ orbital missions for the year → the plan the current pace is measured against
- **30 Jul 2026** — 180 world launches YTD; Falcon 9 at 88; Vandenberg and the Cape level at 49 each → the snapshot every 2026 series in this index is cut at

## Cross-industry ripple

- **Satellite operators:** Half of world launch capacity resting on one vehicle means a Falcon 9 stand-down is a schedule event for operators with no SpaceX contract at all. _(inference)_
- **Insurance:** A ±4% definitional uncertainty in national launch counts propagates into any frequency-based rate model built on public data. _(inference)_
- **Chinese constellation programmes:** Deployment schedules assume a cadence roughly 50% above the current run rate; either the schedule slips or the launch rate has to step-change. _(inference)_
- **Spaceport infrastructure:** Two ranges handling 54% of world launch pushes range turnaround, airspace and maritime closure capacity toward becoming the binding constraint. _(inference)_
- **European space policy:** Four launches in seven months against Rocket Lab’s ten reframes European launch as a sovereignty question rather than a market-share one. _(inference)_

## Non-obvious reads (interpretation)

_This section is interpretation, not sourced fact — each item names the observation it is built on and a confidence level._

- **Observation:** Four credible sources report China’s 2025 launches as 90, 92, 93 and 97.
  **Read:** If a loud, tracked, publicly catalogued event carries a 7.8% measurement spread, then softer space-industry metrics — satellite counts, constellation progress, revenue — carry considerably more. The defensible move is to publish the spread rather than pick a number, and to treat any single-source launch-share chart as an opinion about methodology. _(confidence: high)_
- **Observation:** Russia’s absolute launch count fell only from 15 (2020) to a comparable annual pace in 2026, but its share fell from 13% to under 6%.
  **Read:** Russia did not collapse as a launch provider; it stood still while the market tripled. Share-based narratives about Russian decline describe growth elsewhere, and the operationally relevant question is not whether Russia is shrinking but whether it can grow at all. _(confidence: high)_
- **Observation:** Vandenberg drew level with Cape Canaveral at 49 launches each.
  **Read:** This is a constellation-geometry effect, not a policy one: the polar and sun-synchronous shells of large constellations cannot be served from an eastward-launching range. Range demand is now shaped by orbital mechanics rather than by the historical geography of American spaceflight, which has implications for where the next spaceport investment has to go. _(confidence: medium)_

## Glossary / key terms

- **Orbital launch attempt** — A launch intended to place a payload in orbit, whether or not it succeeds. Distinct from a successful launch.
- **Launching state** — The state from whose territory or facility a launch occurs — not necessarily the operator’s nationality. A common source of counting disagreement.
- **Cadence** — Launch frequency, usually expressed per year or per month.
- **LEO / SSO** — Low Earth orbit; sun-synchronous orbit, a polar orbit reachable only from ranges that can launch toward the poles.
- **Mega-constellation** — A satellite network of thousands of spacecraft, requiring sustained high launch cadence to deploy.
- **Range turnaround** — The time a launch site needs between launches — pad refurbishment, airspace and maritime closures, safety review.

## How to use this with AI

Paste this file into an LLM context window (or a RAG store) and ask cross-series questions. The tables carry a `source_ref` per row; the source registry below maps each ref to a named source and a trust tier.

### Suggested prompts (multi-series)

```text
Using china_count_conflict, state the range of reported Chinese 2025 launches, compute the spread as a percentage, and explain what methodological choice produces each figure. Cite each source_ref.
```

```text
From china_target_gap and by_country_2026, compute how many launches China needs per month from August to December 2026 to reach 140, and explain why the file declines to plot an extrapolated full-year figure.
```

```text
Using top_vehicles_2026 and launches_by_year, compute Falcon 9’s share of world launch in 2026 to date and describe the concentration risk that implies.
```

```text
From us_vs_china, calculate the growth multiple for each country between 2020 and 2025 and explain what the vehicle-level data says about why they differ.
```

```text
List everything in this file that is a stated plan rather than an observed value, and everything that was deliberately dropped in verification.
```

## Sources & trust

| ref | source | trust tier | url |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| sso-launches | Space Stats Online — orbital launches by year and country | T4 · Aggregator / market-research vendor | https://spacestatsonline.com/launches/year/2026/ |
| ids-2025 | Ill-Defined Space — Global Orbital Launch Summary 2025 |  | https://www.illdefined.space/the-ill-defined-space-global-orbital-launch-summary-2025/ |
| cnsa-cctv-2025 | China National Space Administration via CCTV News, 3 January 2026 | T1 · Government / regulator / central bank | https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2026/space-260103-globaltimes01.htm |
| keeptrack-china | KeepTrack — China launch cadence and constellations 2025/2026 |  | https://keeptrack.space/deep-dive/china-launch-cadence-2025-2026 |

## Caveats & what this index cannot answer

- Payload mass to orbit by country or provider — no consistently-methodised open source was found, so capability is proxied only by launch count.
- Guowang and Qianfan constellation sizes — the only available source returned an identical planned-satellite figure for both, which is not credible as two independent values, so both were dropped.
- Launch counts for vehicles or sites below the published top five — omitted rather than aggregated into a synthetic "other".
- A definitive Chinese 2025 launch total. Four credible sources disagree and none publishes a reconciliation; this file shows all four.
- SpaceX valuation, Starlink subscribers, or launch cost per kilogram — deliberately out of scope; see /data/space-economy.
- Full-year 2026 totals. Every 2026 figure is year-to-date at 30 July and is not extrapolated.
- Estimates and forward targets are labelled in the working dataset; never read a labelled estimate or forecast as a settled figure.
- This is an observational data index, not investment, legal, or medical advice.

## Data freshness & methodology

- **Last updated:** 2026-08-14
- **Data as of:** 2026-07
- **What changed most recently:** Through 30 July 2026 the world recorded 180 orbital launch attempts, 88 of them Falcon 9. China had flown 53 against a stated target of 140 or more for the year. Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral were level at 49 launches each.

**Methodology (as seeded):**

> This index answers one question: who actually launches to orbit, and why
> can nobody agree on the count? It deliberately does NOT cover SpaceX
> valuation, Starlink subscribers or launch cost per kilogram — those are
> the existing /data/space-economy index. This one is the launch market
> around SpaceX: national cadence, vehicle and range concentration,
> China’s gap to its own plan, and the measurement problem.
> 
> BASIS — ATTEMPTS, NOT SUCCESSES. The annual series, the country tables,
> the vehicle table and the site table all count orbital launch ATTEMPTS
> and all come from one compiler, so the methodology is constant across
> the seven years shown. Mixing compilers across years would create a
> trend out of a definitional change. The 2026 figures are year-to-date at
> 30 July 2026 and are labelled as partial in every subtitle.
> 
> CORROBORATION. The 2025 point is the one that can be checked against an
> independent compilation: 324 attempts and 315 successes here, against a
> separately assembled 315 successful launches elsewhere. Exact agreement
> on the success count is what makes this series usable despite neither
> source being a national agency.
> 
> THE CENTRAL CAVEAT — THE COUNT IS CONTESTED. Four credible compilations
> report Chinese 2025 orbital launches as 90, 92, 93 and 97, including 92
> from China’s own space administration. That seven-launch spread is 7.8%
> of the total. The causes are definitional: attempts versus successes,
> whether a launch failing to reach orbit counts, attribution by launching
> state versus operator nationality, and local-versus-UTC dating around
> the year boundary. None of the four publishes a reconciliation. This
> index charts all four rather than picking one, and readers should carry
> an uncertainty band of roughly plus or minus 4% on any Chinese launch
> share figure. The same disagreement exists for 2024 (66 versus 68).
> 
> NOT EXTRAPOLATED. The implied full-year 2026 run rates — about 310
> worldwide and about 91 for China — appear in the section detail text as
> observations and are NOT seeded as data points. Launch activity is
> back-loaded within a calendar year, so a seven-month extrapolation is a
> weak estimator, and estimates do not belong on a chart of observed
> values.
> 
> CAVEAT — TOP FIVE ONLY. The source publishes a top five for launch
> vehicles and for launch sites. Entries below the fifth are OMITTED
> rather than aggregated into a synthetic "other" bar, so those two charts
> do not sum to the world total and their subtitles say so.
> 
> CAVEAT — 140 IS A PLAN. China’s 2026 target of 140 or more orbital
> missions is a stated plan, not a forecast and not an achievement. It is
> labelled as such in the subtitle and in the point’s value_basis.
> 
> DROPPED IN VERIFICATION. Three candidate series did not survive the
> verification pass and are absent rather than approximated: the Wikipedia
> 2026-in-spaceflight statistics tables (internally inconsistent totals);
> Guowang and Qianfan constellation sizes (the only available source
> returned an identical planned-satellite figure for both constellations,
> which is not credible as two independent values); and payload mass to
> orbit by country (no consistently-methodised open source found).
> 
> Compiled and verified 2026-08-14. Working sheet with every source
> passage: Topics_Content/data/batch-6_aerospace_2026-08-14.md

---

_Free tier. The full row-level dataset and per-source detail live on the live page and in the working file. Canonical: <https://deepstoryresearch.com/data/orbital-launch-market>. Deepstory Research · https://deepstoryresearch.com_